work which advocates a philosophy far removed from that which generated the internal market in health care. Now that the demise of the internal market has been formally announced, Titmuss' book in a new edition1 deserves careful attention from those who are debating what will succeed it. We owe a debt of gratitude to Titmuss for keeping alight the candle of altruism in fairly dark days. It is not simply that his work sits uncomfortably with financially driven health care: it makes a self-evident nonsense of the extremes to which some of the more naive apostles of that philosophy have been driven.
The strength of Titmuss' work is that, in a sphere where generalization and assertion are widely prevalent, he presents us with a documented case history by comparing the provision of blood for patients in the United States and Britain. The result is a powerful indictment of a commercial market, in which donors are rewarded and third parties make profits at the expense of recipients who have to pay in cash or in kind. Replacement of altruistic with financial motives, he argues, increases the danger of contaminated blood and leads to the costly, inefficient and bureaucratic processes required to manage the market place. There is also a pervasive damaging effect upon social and professional relationships as self-interest replaces altruism. All this will strike a familiar chord with those of us who have been following in the columns of the New England Journal of Medicine the debate upon the impact of 'managed care' upon treatment.
In a brief but perceptive postscript to the new edition, Julian Le Grand points out that, of all these arguments, the general case that altruism leads to more efficient processes is the least persuasive. Associations do not prove causality, and the fact that the price of blood in the United States was five to fifteen times as high as in Britain at the time of Titmuss' study cannot necessarily be attributed to voluntary donation in a non-profit-making service. Efficiency is not an inevitable or even frequent property of freely donated services, as anyone familiar with hospital voluntary shops would be forced to acknowledge. But such reservations do -0768 not apply to the rest of Titmuss' work. His analysis of how commercial motivation can impact upon the nature of the service and upon social and professional relationships has only been reinforced by subsequent experience.
Titmuss chose for his case study altruism at its purest. Blood donation is an act freely undertaken which entails inconvenience and discomfort; the beneficiary is unknown, social pressure to make the gift usually negligible. It is not unique. The same implicit values make medical charities amongst the most successful in the UK. Medical research and teaching depend upon volunteer patients who stand to gain no reward themselves, but act to benefit others, perhaps only many years in the future. This form of altruism does not occupy the same moral high ground, however. A gift that is made during the course of professional care can never be free of the suspicion of moral pressure.
It is this complex mixture of motives which leads me to the core importance of this book at the present time. Gifts of tissues, money or time to meet specific needs are a small if essential and commendable part of the health service. Altruism extends much further. As an implicit value of a civilized society it underlies the care offered by professionals, who do not provide their services as part of a commercial transaction with a 'customer' who is the patient. If, on the Humean principle, Health Service employees were 'knaves' whose actions were determined solely by self interest, the NHS simply would not work.
But there is a much broader issue of immediate relevance at this time of reassessment and that is the philosophy which underlies the provision of a free health service. Altruism is at the root of the principles on which the NHS was founded. At times the real world has encroached on the fulfilment of this ideal. In its early years, the NHS literally provided free treatment for all, including those who came to the UK to obtain it. When this ceased to be feasible, proposed constraints met with bitter opposition on the grounds that they represented a denial of that basic Samaritan principle. It would be interesting to study the reasons that led post-war society to embrace public altruism so strongly. While some might interpret it as a return to the absolutism of Christian values, Titmuss puts forward a persuasive alternative, based upon social and political science. Altruism is desirable because its absence is destructive to society. A society that neglects the needy and destitute in favour of self interest is a poisonous environment in which to live. Altruism becomes, according to this view, a special form of self-interest, but one which is shared with other members of a beneficent society. The evidence of social surveys confirms that this perspective is still widely held, although there seems less commitment to translating it into increased payment through taxation. Consistency of moral principle is a luxury that society has been only too willing to dispose of.
Certain values are shared by civilized societies. Altruism is one of these; equity and fairness and respect for individual autonomy are others. They have been frequently breached in the real world of practical necessity: at times we have to accept such outcomes, but under protest. We cannot afford to forget that some values are to be respected whether they arise from humanism or from religion. They have to be recognized and declared. We have surely learnt in recent years that they cannot be replaced by something which will emerge deus ex machina from the internal market or from a Marxist process of historical necessity. Science, 1997 [ISBN 0-7530-1201 pp. £14.99] 
